Officials recently released more than 550 pages of documents — including results from an FAA accident report, witness testimony and a Judge Advocate General’s (JAG) investigation — stemming from the Dec. 8 F/A 18 military jet crash that killed four members of the Yoon family in University City (UC). On March 3, military brass blamed several officers for a series of mishaps related to the F/A 18 Hornet crash that killed two women and two children. At about 11:59 a.m. Dec. 8., Lt. Dan Neubauer ejected from the doomed aircraft while attempting to make an emergency landing at Miramar’s Runway 6. After experiencing a series of mechanical failures, the military jet officially “departed controlled flight” before reaching the runway, so officials “called for the [pilot] to eject,” the JAG report said. The Hornet slammed into a UC home at 4416 Cather Ave., killing two girls, their mother and grandmother. During the March 3 briefing, a panel of top military officials listed the mistakes that led to the accident, from maintenance errors to a decision made by ground crew that day to land at Miramar instead of the closer North Island. “The tragedy that occurred was clearly avoidable,” said Maj. Gen. Randolph Alles, assistant wing commander, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, during the briefing. “If he landed at North Island, this would have been prevented.” Newly released documents show that pilot Neubauer called the USS Abraham Lincoln’s control tower upon the plane’s first signs of distress but was diverted from landing onboard the ship. Tower representatives on the Navy ship guided Neubauer through a series of emergency procedures, including flying toward North Island with his landing gear down, witnesses aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln said. But, according to the JAG report, officials soon advised Neubauer to land at Miramar instead of North Island, calling the decision “prudent” because of the pilot’s experience level and comfort with the base. Neubauer studied at Quantico, Va., in 2007 before passing through three additional flight schools, according to the pilot’s chronological record. Neubauer was an “FRS Basic” student at MCAS, Miramar with the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), documents show. On Dec. 8, the student pilot was flying alone inside an F/A 18 Hornet aircraft off the USS Abraham Lincoln until a cautionary oil light flashed. Neubauer requested a “rep in the tower,” telling the ship’s crew the plane was “dirty,” documents stated. Tower representatives said they responded to the pilot, talking him through emergency protocol. A military witness aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln said he looked overhead and saw the aircraft, radioed the pilot and began directing him to land onboard, JAG documents stated. “The [USS Abraham Lincoln officer] overheard this and immediately told me that he would not take ‘an emergency aircraft’ aboard and told me to divert him,” the witness reported. “I got no further input from the [official] as I got back onto the radio and directed [the pilot] to start a bingo profile to North Island.” The Navy’s FRS commanding officer aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln, hearing the pilot’s first distress call, said that, as a rule, according to documents, officials “are very reluctant to accept student emergencies for shipboard recovery.” Radio control tower representatives began directing the pilot to North Island instead, documents stated. “North Island was the primary divert… but Miramar was only 10 miles further… I told 253 to turn towards North Island,” the USS Abraham Lincoln radio representative said. “The pilot of 253 did ask if he should declare an emergency, and I told him he should.” USS Abraham Lincoln radio controllers handed Neubauer off to civilian radio controllers at South Bay radar facility, but documents show that the pilot continued communicating with ground representatives. According to FAA documents, [South Bay’s air traffic controller] asked Neubauer whether he wanted to land at Miramar or North Island. “I got a phone call… [from Miramar suggesting] that if fuel wasn’t an issue, 253 should come to Miramar. I agreed with this plan since fuel was not an issue and Miramar was only 10 miles further,” a military witness testified in the JAG report. South Bay’s air traffic controller said, “… just let me know if you want to change to North Island, I’m going to keep you on that heading. It’s going to run you by North Island and it’s going to be the shortcut to Miramar, so just let me know what you need.” Neubauer told the tower he was coordinating with people on the ground to “figure out what we’re doing,” FAA documents show. Officials at Miramar said they thought the plane had enough fuel to land at Miramar but events piled on one another, from the oil pressure to a light indicating low fuel. “… Based on the [pilot’s] level of experience and proficiency, the [plane’s] fuel state and weather conditions, a recovery to MCAS Miramar was determined to be prudent,” the JAG summary stated. Military officials said that although the pilot secured the plane’s right engine, the plane lost “function of, among other things, its speed brake, normal braking and nose wheel steering,” adding that the safest recovery for the now single-engine aircraft in that condition is an arrested landing using an arresting hook with multiple attempts, JAG documents stated. Between 11:50 a.m. and 11:57 a.m., the pilot began experiencing various emergencies, from a high oil temperature, problems with the fuel circulating system and then lights signaling low fuel. Military personnel on the ground at MCAS, Miramar on Dec. 8 reported seeing the jet exude a black puff of smoke before the pilot ejected. “I asked [Neubauer] again how he heard me and he said loud and clear,” MCAS, Miramar ground crew said in the JAG report. “I once again started my brief and then noticed his jet in a left angle of bank … It looked like he might be losing control, so I called, ‘Eject, eject, eject,’ and simultaneously saw that he had already initiated ejection. I saw the jet impact what appeared to be the ground level with my elevation…” Col. Anthony Prato, investigating officer, 1 Marine Expeditionary Force, led the military’s investigation, which resulted in the firing of four officers, including the commanding officer, an operations officer, an aviation maintenance officer and an operations duty officer. Additional servicemen were officially reprimanded.